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Abstract. We outline a quantum-enabled blockchain architecture based on a consortium
of quantum servers. The network is hybridised, utilising digital systems for sharing and
processing classical information combined with a fibre–optic infrastructure and quantum
devices for transmitting and processing quantum information. We deliver an energy efficient
interactive mining protocol enacted between clients and servers which uses quantum infor-
mation encoded in light and removes the need for trust in network infrastructure. Instead,
clients on the network need only trust the transparent network code, and that their devices
adhere to the rules of quantum physics. To demonstrate the energy efficiency of the mining
protocol, we elaborate upon the results of two previous experiments (one performed over 1km
of optical fibre) as applied to this work. Finally, we address some key vulnerabilities, explore
open questions, and observe forward–compatibility with the quantum internet and quantum
computing technologies.
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1. Introduction
Blockchain technology has shown potential for transforming traditional industry with its
key characteristics of decentralization, transparency, persistency, and auditability. Despite
the great potential of blockchain, it faces numerous challenges, which limit the wide use of
blockchain technology. For example, the energy consumption of the Bitcoin blockchain1,2,3
has been predicted to eclipse total global energy consumption by 2020.4 Blockchain tech-
nology also faces issues with security, privacy, and scalability. Blockchain consensus faces
challenges too, for example, some popular proof–of–work5 algorithms result in energy waste6
whereas proof–of–stake7 may result in resource or wealth concentration.8 As a result, fun-
damental redesign of blockchain architectures may be required to ensure the technology is
capable of widespread acceptance whilst retaining its attractive qualities.9,10
This work is a contribution in that direction, which explores mining new blocks on
a quantum–enabled blockchain using light generated by energy efficient quantum optical
devices (See Figure 1 for a conceptual overview). Quantum optical devices are a new type
of network infrastructure for secure transmission and processing of quantum information.
These devices offer advantages over traditional network infrastructures due to the fact that
the information is transmitted, encoded, and decoded using physical systems which adhere
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to the laws of quantum physics. Quantum optical devices operate at the single photon level,
where a photon is the smallest permissible unit of light. Formally, a single bit of quantum
information is called a quantum bit, or qubit, and in the case of optical encodings, infor-
mation is encoded onto a photonic qubit using degrees of freedom which correspond to
physical parameters of the photon (e.g. polarization, angular momentum, spatial mode, or a
combination11). This optical encoding, when paired with the quantum properties of qubits,
guarantees an inherent protection against eavesdropping,12,13,14 affords compatibility with
quantum computing,15,16,17,18,19 and permits secure information distribution and informa-
tion teleportation on optical networks.20,21,22,23,24,25
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Fig. 1. Overview of the mining protocol on a quantum–enabled consortium blockchain.
Clients and servers participate in an energy efficient interactive mining protocol for generating
and committing entanglement as a resource towards securing a blockchain. In (a), servers
announce candidate blocks to a pool of clients who verify blocks against verification criteria.
In (b), authenticated clients may participate in block mining through an interactive protocol.
Upon successful mining, the block is admitted into a consensus round for inclusion into
the blockchain. Importantly, the physical network infrastructure is considered untrusted by
the clients in the mining round, which includes the consortium of quantum servers. The
authentication, mining, and consensus protocols are designed to detect malicious actions on
behalf of the consortium and incentivise honest behaviours, such that quantum servers are
held publicly accountable to act in the best interests of clients on the network. See main text
for details.
Tests of this new infrastructure have proven the robustness of quantum optical devices in
real–world scenarios. Some recent examples include quantum key distribution,26,27,28,29,30
31 quantum verification,32,33,34,35 and mobile quantum communication protocols,36,37,38,39
40 all of which are compatible with existing telecommunication networks.41,42,43 Here, we
present a means of integrating quantum optical devices into a blockchain architecture, and
deliver an interactive quantum protocol designed for energy efficient mining on a blockchain
using light, namely using entanglement as a resource for securing new blocks on a blockchain,
which we term proof of entanglement (PoE). Entanglement is a new kind of resource that is
2 0
as real as energy,44 with applications in communication, cryptography, computation, and
information distribution technologies.
In this work, we elaborate upon results from two previous proof–in–principle exper-
iments, and explore how the PoE mining protocol may be readily implemented with a
Sagnac interferometer,45,46,47 functioning, in this case, as a quantum server. The role of
the quantum server is to generate entanglement, encoded in photonic qubits, which is sent
to clients on the network via direct fibre link. This approach to blockchain redesign with
quantum compatibility in mind contrasts starkly with contemporary trends in information
technology, whereby developers resist emerging quantum technologies (like quantum com-
puting) by implementing “quantum–resistant” protocols and algorithms on traditional (i.e.
non–quantum) platforms.48,49,50 By presenting an alternative blockchain architecture, we
hope to promote further investigation into issues and advantages of novel quantum–enabled
blockchain protocols,51,52,53,54,55,56 and more generally, offer insight into the process of
mapping traditional scientific computing technologies onto newly emerging quantum tech-
nologies.57,58,59,60,61,62
2. Structure of paper
In Section 3, we explore the connection between entanglement and trust. In Section 4, we
detail the architecture and devices which support authentication, mining, and consensus
on the quantum–enabled blockchain. In Section 5, we deliver our main result, the proof–
of–entanglement mining protocol. In Section 6 we explore the results of two previous
proof–in–principle experiments which support a preliminary energy efficiency analysis of the
network and protocol. Section 7 offers a discussion and analysis of vulnerabilities. Section 8
concludes the work.
3. Entanglement and trust
In 1935, researchers began exploring the notion that a pair of physical systems separated by
vast distances might instantaneously influence one other. This idea sprouted from the mathe-
matical formalism of the newly emerging quantum theory, and caused a great deal of contro-
versy.63 At the time, the strangeness of the predicted phenomenon caused Einstein to reject
the possibility of such occurrences, under the assertion that the emerging quantum theory must
be incomplete.64 Since then, experimental investigations into the phenomenon of entangle-
ment have rigorously proven and characterised the effect,65,66,67,68,69,70,71,72,73,74,75,76,77
and today, entanglement is placed as the “missing link” for the unification of quantum theory
and gravity.78,79,80,81 Along the way, physical devices and algorithms have been developed
in laboratories all over the world which have directly tested the existence and utility of the
phenomenon. Recently, the devices involved in such tests have undergone rapid technological
advancement,82,83,84,85,86 and the majority of components, which typically consist of com-
mercially available arrangements of lasers, mirrors, nonlinear crystals, optical detectors, and
integrated photonic devices, have experienced reduced manufacturing costs and increased
availability.87
Interestingly, the interplay between the phenomenon of entanglement and the physical
devices used in testing the existence of the phenomenon has also been the subject of intense
research. These research outcomes have demonstrated that entanglement can be used as an
indicator of device trustworthiness, such that, under appropriate circumstances, if entangle-
ment is observed, then a device’s behaviour may be certified as trustworthy.88,89,90,91,92,93
This is termed device–independent entanglement verification, and is a powerful and practical
application borne from research into the field of quantum information science. In these
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applications, initially untrusted pairs of non–communicating devices participate in a protocol
which monitors the device’s inputs and outputs, and, irrespective of the devices functionality,
enacts a trust–test on the device’s behaviour based upon the experimental data which may
guarantee a correct and therefore trusted functionality. The confirmation of trustworthiness
certifies that the devices physically interact with an entangled resource in such a way that the
resultant correlations observed in the experimental data cannot be recreated or emulated by
any arrangement of non–communicating analogue, digital, or quantum systems.94 Thus, the
devices either yield a correct and secure result, or the trust–test detects that the devices are
insecure (either working incorrectly or are under the control of a dishonest party), and any
subsequent protocols (which may deal with valuable, sensitive, or private information) are
aborted. Such protocols are highly desirable for practical implementation as they provide a
higher level of security, unachievable by traditional systems. Here, we apply this technology
towards developing blockchain–specific protocols which are energy efficient and secure
against general adversaries.
4. Devices and architecture of the quantum–enabled blockchain
The architecture we propose consists of i) a network consortium of quantum servers, com-
prised of quantum optical devices which generate light for encoding quantum information, ii)
a pool of clients whom operate quantum modems for decoding quantum information stored
in light, and iii) an optical fibre network which connects the client’s quantum modems to the
quantum servers. We assume a cryptographic scenario whereby the quantum servers and
modems operate from secure environments which prevent unwanted information leakage. To
communicate between one another, the servers and clients utilise insecure but authenticated
classical channels and authenticated quantum channels (Figure 2(a)). The servers and clients
are able to process classical information in a trusted way within their secure environment.
Devices used for processing quantum information are assumed to operate in accordance with
the laws of quantum physics, however in the mining round, no assumptions are made about
the quantum servers or network infrastructure. An adversary may access (but not modify)
classical information shared between the server and client, and may access and modify
quantum information shared between them. An adversary is assumed complete knowledge of
the authentication, mining, and consensus protocols, but does not have access to the random
data generated by the client in their secure environment (except for information deduced
from what they make public).
Figure 2 (b) summarizes the network devices, device subsystems, and device’s trust
statuses, with quantum servers consisting of i) an attenuated and modulated laser source
(for client authentication, described below), ii) a high–quality source of two–qubit photonic
entanglement, iii) a device for performing measurements upon photonic qubits generated by
the entanglement source, and iv) a source of randomness, for example, a quantum random
number generator95 (QRNG). Quantum modems contain i) an embedded photonic key and
spatial light modulators (for client authentication, described below), ii) a measurement device
for performing measurements upon photonic qubits, and iii) a QRNG, or a trusted and secure
pseudo–random number generator.
Blockchain consensus protocols undertaken by a consortium of trusted entities have
received little treatment in literature, but are of considerable interest in practice, with
mainstream financial institutions actively exploring their use.96 Traditionally, in a pub-
lic blockchain everyone can participate in the consensus process. In a consortium blockchain,
only a subset of “nodes”, or in this case, quantum servers, are selected to participate in
consensus. However, in the consortium blockchain architecture we propose, the consortium
is considered untrusted at the start of each round of block creation, and must be publicly
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Fig. 2. High–level overview of the quantum–enabled blockchain and devices. a) Illus-
trates networking between an untrusted consortium of quantum servers (pink rectangles) and
clients equipped with quantum modems (blue squares). Green links represent an insecure but
authenticated classical communication channel and an authenticated quantum communication
channel. Clients may access servers depending on the coverage map (green circles), with
coverage radius depending upon infrastructure constraints. b) Presents an overview of the trust
status and device subsystems required for interacting with the quantum–enabled blockchain.
See main text for details.
elected by network clients through successful interactions in the mining round in order to
qualify for the consensus round. In this way, clients trust only their own personal devices and
the transparent network code. We now explore the details of block creation, which consists
of an authentication round, mining round, and consensus round.
4.1. Authentication Round—The authentication round utilises a decoy–state variant of
the quantum secure authentication (QSA) protocol,97,98,99 allowing for hardware–based
authentication of clients.The QSA protocol is a quantum cryptographic security primitive
for the purposes of identification, authentication, read–proof key storage, key distribution,
tamper detection, anti–counterfeiting, software–to–hardware binding, and trusted computing.
Formally, the QSA protocol does not rely upon pre–shared secrets or seed keys, does not
depend on the secrecy of stored data, does not depend on unproven mathematical assumptions,
affords tamper resistance of devices, and is straightforward to implement with current
technology (see Appendix A for additional information). The QSA protocol utilises photonic
qubits (or more generally, quantum states of light), generated by a quantum server and sent,
via a quantum communication channel, to a client–controlled quantum modem. The modems
store an embedded photonic key, formally referred to as a physically unclonable key, which
are optically addressed and read using quantum states of light. Each photonic key is uniquely
random by design, and is impossible to clone, spoof, or copy.100,101,102 Using quantum
readout of physically unclonable keys guarantees accurate real–time verification and makes
spoofing fundamentally difficult due to the no–cloning theorem of quantum physics.103 By
utilising the quantum secure authentication protocol, vulnerability to the Sybil attack104 is
diminished as entry to the network is physically gated, incurring a resource cost in the case
of multiple pseudonyms attributed to the same individual. As well as functioning as a secure
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hardware–based authenticator, the integrated photonic key may also serve as a physical
address which can be uniquely attributed to a client on the network, allowing provision for
dues paying or rewards to physical addresses that build a trustworthy reputation, and may be
used in conjunction with a root seed for generating hierarchical deterministic wallets.105
4.2. Mining Round—After authentication, the mining round utilises a variant of the
EPR steering protocol,106,107,108 termed the PoE protocol, which acts as an entanglement
witness and trust–test on the behaviour of a quantum server in the consortium (described in
detail below). The PoE protocol is interactive, and requires that the quantum server engage
with clients on the network to generate the resource (entanglement or cumulative trust) for
securing the blockchain, forming an example of resource–efficient mining.109 At the start of
a new mining round, each quantum server announces a candidate block. Clients observe the
announcements and, pending successful block verification, nominate themselves to participate
in block mining. Clients are free to choose which servers to interact with (provided they
reside within the region of server coverage) and work to elect servers into the voting round
based upon i) the validity of the candidate block (agreement with block verification metrics),
ii) the reputation of the quantum server (historical performance), iii) the throughput of the
quantum server (i.e. rate of entanglement generation), and iv) connection availability (server
proximity and reliability). Servers then assemble a team of unique clients, self–nominated
for mining (termed miners), to interactively generate and accumulate entanglement. Success
in the mining round depends upon how much entanglement is generated by servers amongst
their team of unique clients within the mining window. Quantum servers are thus incentivised
to construct viable mining teams (in accordance with any construction metrics or regulations)
and cultivate a reputation for honest behaviour. The subset of quantum servers in the
consortium who “win” the mining round are then permitted to participate in the subsequent
consensus round.
4.3. Consensus Round—The results of the mining round determine which subset of
quantum servers in the consortium are elected into the consensus round. The number of
servers in the subset are determined by network protocol, only their identities change from
round to round. We explore a consensus mechanism based upon a modified delegated Byzan-
tine fault tolerant protocol110 (BFT) for securing new blocks and achieving decentralised
consensus on the quantum–enabled blockchain. We choose a modified delegated BFT con-
sensus protocol as it retains an element of decentralisation through interactive mining and
circumvents the creation of branches off the main chain. Quantum servers that move into the
consensus round are therefore always obligated to append newly mined blocks to the main
chain with the most cumulative invested entanglement (or trust) recorded via PoE, and due to
the mechanism of publicly electing delegates, the fate of the main chain is democratically
guided as quantum servers must earn the right to vote in the consensus round through suc-
cessful interactions with clients. Consensus finality (also referred to as forward security111)
is satisfied by all BFT and state–machine replication protocols,112 and BFT is resistant to
server outages or arbitrarily long periods of asynchrony.113 Here, consensus finality is a
property which guarantees that blocks cannot be removed from the chain once added,114,115
facilitating rapid confirmation and inclusions of transactions into the blockchain once candi-
date blocks have been successfully mined. Upon initiation of the consensus round, one of the
servers in the subset is nominated as a “speaker”, with the remainder of servers presiding
as “delegates”, who are tasked with voting against the speaker’s nomination. The speaker’s
nomination consists of the candidate block, mined by clients in the mining round, which the
speaker presents on behalf of the clients for consideration by the consortium. Provided 66%
of servers vote honestly, consensus will be reached. If the nomination and accompanying
PoE are valid, then the block will be included in the chain. If the speaker’s nomination is
detected as being illegitimate (e.g. the speaker nominates a block with an invalid or falsified
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PoE), then the consensus round automatically starts anew, with a new speaker elected and
the original speaker incurring a reputation loss and demotion to the role of delegate for that
round. Section 7 covers potential attack vectors in more detail.
5. The “proof–of–entanglement” mining protocol
5.1. Protocol background, assumptions, and characteristics—We now discuss the min-
ing protocol in more detail. Candidate data blocks are announced to the network by quantum
servers in the consortium, spreading to clients via the gossip protocol. The blocks must be
compiled according to the network ruleset, consisting of a cryptographic hash of relevant
information (e.g. recent transactions, code for smart contracts, digital media tags, etc.), which
a quantum server recommends for inclusion into the blockchain data structure. Clients check
the candidate blocks against key block verification criteria, and upon successful verification,
will nominate themselves as miners for that block and wait to be placed in a mining team.
As clients are drawn from the mining team, one by one, they will participate in the
interactive mining protocol to test measurement data (generated between their quantum
modem and the quantum server) for quantum correlations which, importantly, cannot be
faked (provided the clients satisfy criteria for one–sided device–independence, described
below). Tests of quantum correlations (or tests of “quantumness”) arise due to physical
interactions with entangled quantum systems, and are witnessed by mathematical inequalities.
These inequalities are derived from constraints imposed upon probability distributions which
quantify the degree of maximum classical correlation allowed under the assumptions of
realism (from objective determinism) and locality (from relativity). These mathematical
inequalities are well studied (for example, Clauser–Horne–Shimony–Holt inequalities116
or EPR–steering inequalities) and are known to act as an entanglement witness, allowing,
in this case, a quantum server to prove honest distribution of entanglement to clients. For
honest interactions, the entanglement generated in the mining round may then be “invested”
towards securing the blockchain data structure in the subsequent consensus round. Dishonest
interactions, which may attempt to fabricate entanglement by distributing unentangled qubits,
falsify timestamps, or utilise Sybil or pre–mine attacks, are either detected or prohibited by
the protocol, and are explored below in Section 7.
Formally, in the case of the mining protocol delivered here, the trust–test performed
against the quantum server will meet the requirements for one–sided device–independence
provided that i) the data produced by the client’s device is the result of measurements
performed upon photonic qubits (this may be verified using measurement data from the au-
thentication round), ii) the client’s device does not leak information (a standard cryptographic
assumption, which may be enforced with proper device design and tamper detection), iii)
measurement inputs on the client side are uniquely generated at the time of measurement by
random and unpredictable processes (enacted with a QRNG), and iv) detection efficiencies
of relevant parties are properly considered and accounted for (in this case, via client–side
tests of loss–tolerant EPR–steering inequalities). Appendix B elaborates on the specific
safeguards required for observing device–independent entanglement witnesses. By ensuring
the requirements for one–sided device independent entanglement verification are met, clients
may interact with the blockchain whilst assuming nothing about the operation or makeup of
external servers or infrastructure. Furthermore, clients trust the transparent network code,
which formally acts as a third party, but in the case of EPR steering inequalities simply
amounts to clients trusting themselves.117 Put differently, clients with limited “quantum
powers” (namely, the ability to perform measurements upon photonic qubits) can use the
mining protocol to monitor and verify the actions of quantum servers such that any deviations
from trustworthy behaviour are easily detectable.
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Fig. 3. The PoE mining protocol, undertaken between a quantum server and client.
Purple shading (left–hand side) indicates the initially untrusted quantum server. Clear shading
(right–hand side) indicates the client, who assumes the validity of quantum physics and trusts
their measurement apparatus. Dashed arrows indicate classical communication channels
between the quantum server and client. Solid arrows indicate quantum communication
channels between the quantum server and client. Step numeration coincides with the steps of
the PoE mining protocol outlined in the main text. In this example, the measurement device
utilised by the client is assumed to perform polarisation measurements upon photonic qubits.
5.2. PoE mining protocol—One at a time, miners will be drawn from the mining team
to participate in the interactive mining protocol, which proceeds as follows (Figure 3):
Step 1. A miner ui is drawn from the mining team {ui}m, where m is the total
number of miners in the team. Each miner is accompanied by metadata which
informs the quantum server of key parameters (e.g. physical address, reputation,
measurement strategy).
Step 2. The quantum server announces that it has transmitted a photonic qubit to
the miner.
Step 3. The miner generates a random measurement input for their device. This
input is generated by reading the bitwise output from the client’s QRNG. The
output is combined under modulo addition with the bit value (or values, depending
on measurement strategy) of the candidate block hash nominated by the quantum
server for mining. This forms the measurement input, which tethers the hash of
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the candidate block to the PoE in a random way that can be validated at a later
time by studying the measurement data.
Step 4. The client announces their choice of measurement input k generated in
Step 3 to the quantum server and performs a measurement upon the photonic qubit.
Step 5. The client privately records the measurement outcome Bk.
Step 6. The quantum server announces a measurement outcome Ak. Although no
assumptions are made about the workings of the quantum server, correlated results
will appear between the client’s secretly recorded Bk and the server’s announced
Ak, provided entanglement is present between the quantum server and client.
Step 7. Steps 2–6 are repeated until sufficient statistics are collected for the
chosen measurement strategy. The measurement duration for each setting is
tuned according to the client’s detection efficiency, to ensure the minimisation of
statistical errors.
Step 8. The client calculates the heralding efficiency η of the quantum server and
the EPR steering parameter Sn (Equation 1, below) from the measurement data,
and checks the calculated parameters against the inequality bound Cn(η) required
for entanglement verification (explored below). If the calculated EPR steering
parameter does not exceed the bound required for entanglement verification, the
network records a null event for that iteration (potentially incurring a reputation
loss against the server) and the next miner is called in from Step 1. If a quantum
server consistently fails to certify the presence of entanglement, it will be flagged
for maintenance and may incur a reputation loss.
Step 9. If the EPR steering parameter exceeds the bound required for entangle-
ment, the inequality successfully witnesses entanglement. The resultant PoE and
measurement data required for the verification (e.g. Sn, η) are appended to the
block and attributed to the client ui.
Step 10. A new client is drawn from the team {ui}m, and Steps 1–9 are repeated
until m clients have witnessed entanglement generation of the quantum server.
The PoE uniquely ties the entanglement investment to the candidate block, and upon
exhausting its team of miners (or upon closure of the mining window), the quantum server
announces it’s accumulation of PoE for that round, such that the results cannot be modified
without re–doing the PoE. Thus, if the quantum server is elected as speaker in the voting
round, the server is obligated to nominate it’s newly mined candidate block. The PoE is easily
verified simply by running the measurement data through the verification witness to ensure
that the key parameters Sn(η) and η generated in the mining round observe entanglement.
Here, the one–way functionality in resource expenditure, which is traditionally observed
in proof–of–work systems, is also preserved via PoE, since generating the PoE requires
physical interaction with an entangled quantum resource (“resource intensive”), but requires
no physical interaction to certify the “quantumness” of the resultant verifier data (”resource
light”).
6. Energy cost and scalability analysis
Demonstrating transmission of entanglement over a channel such as an optical fiber is im-
portant for real–world viability of the PoE protocol. Thus, we utilise the results of two
previous proof–in–principle experiments implemented with a polarization Sagnac interfer-
ometer (Figure 4) to demonstrate the robustness and energy efficiency of the protocol. In
the first experiment, a lossy channel was inserted into the entanglement source to test the
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validity of the one–sided device independent entanglement verification protocol, even in
cases of extreme photon loss.118 This test characterised and addressed vulnerabilities in the
entanglement verification protocol which might otherwise be used to exploit photon loss (on
the “server” side) for fabricating entanglement. In the second experiment, a lossy channel
was inserted between the output of the entanglement source (the “server”) and the detection
apparatus (the “client”), closely mimicking a real–world client–server configuration.119 In
this second test, the client trusted their own measurement device (equivalent to a simplified
quantum modem), and holds the entanglement source (equivalent to a simplified quantum
server) accountable to demonstrate honest behaviour by overcoming the inequality constraints
placed upon the server’s reported efficiencies tested in the first experiment.
(a) (b)
Client
Quantum
 server
Laser
Interferometer
loop
Client
1km fiber coil
Variable loss filter
From laser
(fiber coupled)
Mirror
Mirror
Nonlinear crystal
HWP QWP Dichroic
FilterPBS
LEGEND
Temperature
controller
Quantum server
Fig. 4. An entanglement source, based upon a polarization Sagnac interferometer,
equivalent to a quantum server. (a) A photograph of the experimental apparatus used in pre-
vious experimental demonstrations (testing the loss–tolerance and viability of the entanglement
verification protocols) which may be implemented as a quantum server and quantum modem
to implement the PoE mining protocol. The device is compact, fitting on a 600x600mm board.
(b) The server and client devices are energy efficient, consisting mostly of passive optical ele-
ments, which include polarising beam splitters (PBS), wavelength filters, silvered and dichroic
mirrors, an optical fiber line, a variable loss neutral–density filter, and half waveplates (HWP)
and quarter waveplates (QWP) for implementing the polarisation measurements required to
test entanglement witnesses based upon loss–tolerant EPR steering inequalities (see main text
for details).
In implementing the PoE protocol, the client trusts their own device, so that protocol
iterations which fail to detect a photonic qubit are safely discarded. However, the client
cannot trust any claims the server makes about the propagation losses or the efficiency of its
detectors. In particular, the client does not trust the server’s claims about how often it sees a
photonic qubit, conditional on the client’s detecting one. Rather, the client makes use only of
the server’s heralding efficiency η : the probability that the server heralds the client’s result
by declaring a measurement outcome (or equivalently, nonzero prediction) Ak for it. The
quantity η is determined by the client wholly from the publicly announced frequencies of
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events to which the client (and the network) has direct access. The key result is that the client
can circumvent loss–dependent vulnerabilities, even in the presence of arbitrarily high loss,
by computing the witness Sn based upon the shared correlations from the inequality
Sn =
1
n
n
∑
k=1
〈AkσˆBk 〉 ≤Cn(η) (1)
and observing that the inequality is violated, thereby signifying entanglement. Here, the
bound Cn(η) is derived by the client, who in doing so, utilises the optimal cheating strategy
available to the server for the observed efficiency and pre–determined measurement strategy
{σˆBk }n. The client’s quantum mechanical measurement operator, denoted σˆBk , defines their
randomly selected choice of measurement setting k drawn from the pre–determined set. In our
experimental demonstrations, these operators define projective polarization measurements,
which in the formalism of optical quantum theory, map an incident qubit (optically encoded
in polarization) onto a polarization measurement basis defined by the transmission and
reflection ports of a polarizing beam splitter.
We utilise the results of the two previous experiments as an analysis and simulation of
mining via PoE. To ensure a good signal–to–noise ratio of detection events on the client side,
the photonic qubit detection rate was optimised to between ≈3000–6000 detection events per
second. The total energy consumption used by the devices in the entanglement verification
stage is estimated at 86W for the quantum server, which consisted of (not including passive
optical elements, which do not consume electricity) two photon detectors (Perkin Elmer
SPCM-AQR-14-FC), one temperature control unit (Thorlabs TEC200C), two waveplate
controllers (Newport PR50CC), one continuous–wave laser (Toptica iBeam 405nm), and one
coincidence electronics unit (UQDevices FPGA). The energy consumption for the client is
estimated at 19W, consisting of one detector (Perkin Elmer SPCM-AQR-14-FC) and two
waveplate controllers (Newport PR50CC). This measure of energy consumption excludes the
energy costs associated with the PCs required to run the equipment, since PCs are assumed
to be a pre-existing component in a server/client infrastructure. The devices considered in
our analysis are simply those needed to upgrade an existing digital system infrastructure to
include quantum capability. At any given moment, the rate of energy delivery per quantum
server running the interactive PoE protocol with a client is estimated at 105W.
For our energy cost analysis, assuming continuous operation over a 24 hour period and
a 10 minute block mining window, the PoE protocol is predicted to service between 288 to
2880 clients (2 to 20 clients per mining team, randomly selected) who interactively mine
144 new blocks. Assuming energy efficient quantum servers with entanglement generation
rates between those we tested (3000 entangled photon pairs per second) up to quantum
servers based upon the latest integrated photonic technologies (6× 107 photon pairs per
second120), each server can be expected to reliably service clients via direct fibre link in a
1km to 50km radius (assuming optical fiber transmission losses of 0.5dB/km, coupling losses
of 80%, and detection losses of 50%). Assuming a consortium testnet of 2000 quantum
servers, the energy consumption based on interactive mining via the PoE protocol is of
order 210kW. Using specially designed hardware, renewable energy sources, and further
optimising server throughput will help to keep energy consumption low, with the added
bonus of forward–compatibility with a quantum internet and optical quantum computing
technologies.
7. Discussion and analysis of vulnerabilities
We note that in a real–world implementation, the client must choose their measurement
settings independently from one iteration of the mining protocol to the next, and safeguards
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must be in place to ensure that no information escapes from the client’s devices unless
they allow it. As these are standard assumptions in cryptographic proofs, these safeguards
were not imposed in the previous experimental demonstrations. In addition, since we (the
experimenters) controlled the server’s implementation of honest or dishonest strategies, there
was no need to enforce a strict time ordering of events. In a field deployment, the protocol
requires that the client only accepts the server’s announcements Ak after the client measures
their photonic qubit and declares their measurement setting k, in accordance with the PoE
protocol described.
This latter requirement circumvents a potential vulnerability, exploitable by a quantum
server, based upon falsified announcements of entanglement generation and fabricated
qubit encodings which might allow a server to fabricate entanglement (termed a cheating
strategy in literature). However, successfully exploiting these vulnerabilities requires that the
server either: a) knows the variables determining the behaviour of the client’s QRNG, or b)
violates backward non–signalling,121 whereby the server is able to send encoding information
backwards in time to a photonic qubit (Figure 5). In the case of the former (a), access to these
variables was proven impossible in 1964 by Bell,122 who demonstrated that such variables
do not exist for quantum systems, meaning no adversary can predict measurement outcomes
prior to a measurement being made (called measurement–independence, see Appendix B).
And in the latter case (b), signalling encoding information backwards in time for use in
a cheating strategy based upon fabricated qubit encodings amounts to a violation of the
standard assumption of locality (in relativistic mechanics, faster than light signalling and
signalling backwards in time are indistinguishable). Thus, provided no information leaks out
of the client’s device, and the client’s device performs measurements upon photonic qubits
to test loss–tolerant EPR steering inequalities, the PoE will generate data that cannot be
simulated or spoofed by a quantum server. This distinction of “quantumness” means that, as
long as an inequality violation is observed, we have the guarauntee, independently of any
implementation details on the server side, that the two systems measured by the client and
server are entangled.
The risk of a traditional pre–mine attack against the network is diminished by infrastruc-
ture cost due to the interactive nature of the mining protocol. Because real data generated
in a genuine round of block creation can be distinguished from attempted simulations of
the required data, an attacker planning a pre–mine attack will need to collude with a large
pool of clients to stage a Sybil attack, with each client needing their own quantum modem
and photonic key. Furthermore, if mining pool construction demands a random selection of
clients, an attacker would need to wait for an optimal mining team assemblage. This means
an attacker planning a Sybil attack would be better incentivised to act as an honest participant.
By ensuring the identities of quantum server operators/administrators are publicly known and
certified prior to entry to the consortium and for participation in consensus via BFT, double
spend attacks may be detected, recorded, and prevented in the consensus round (also at the
start of the round of block creation through block verification by clients), provided two thirds
of quantum servers on the network are acting honestly and serving the best interests of the
network. Heavy increases in the throughput of a quantum server (in terms of entanglement
generation rates) allows servers to overcome transmission losses more easily whilst remaining
publicly accountable and limited in their capacity to arbitrarily command network consensus.
This allows for an increased area of coverage and/or greater flexibility in constructing mining
teams, which due to the interactive nature of the mining protocol, benefits clients too.
Other factors which affect mining rates include detection efficiencies, transmission loss,
coupling efficiencies, measurement strategy, and the switching rate between measurement
settings. To optimise network performance and ensure fair competition between servers, a
provider might impose reward restrictions or sanctions against a subset of high–performance
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quantum servers, or choose to implement composition rules for constructing mining teams,
opting for completely general mining (maximum competition and freedom amongst servers),
standardised mining (some competition and restricted freedoms), or restricted mining (col-
laborative and regulated). Servers which perform well may build a strong reputation and
potentially be rewarded, depending on the network objectives and ruleset.
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Fig. 5. Spacetime diagrams for mining via PoE in the case of an honest and dishonest
quantum server. Red squiggles represent photonic qubits, which in (a), are entangled.
Measurements are denoted using pink (quantum server) and blue (client) crosses. Classical
data is communicated with dashed lines in accordance with the mining protocol (main text).
Secret data is communicated with solid lines. Purple shading represents times during which the
quantum server is able to transmit a photonic qubit, within the limitations of the protocol, to the
client. Green shading represents times during which the server may announce measurement
outcomes Ak (recorded by the client after they perform their measurement). In (b), so–called
cheating strategies are considered which permit false announcements, falsified timestamps,
and fabricated qubit encodings (pink disk), which a server might utilise in an attempt to
fabricate entanglement. Successful attempts require violating backwards non–signalling (A)
or measurement–independence (B). See main text for details.
As a final commentary, at a high level, the quantum–enabled blockchain architecture we
consider aims to incorporate four systems which work together to enable and incentivize
trustworthy behaviour, these being123: morals, reputation, institutions, and security. The first
two systems, morals and reputation, are supported through a system of peer–to–peer trust,
whereby clients and servers come to trust one another through public interactions and build a
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reputation for honest behaviour.124 The third system, institutions, traditionally have rules,
contracts, and laws which formalize reputation and encourage people to behave according
to the group norm (and enact sanctions against those who do not). The institutional trust
system, supplanted by transparent network code, allows parties that don’t trust each other
(i.e. server/client pairs) to enter into an agreement through mutual trust in an overarching
system of rules, laws, or logic that will help resolve disputes (implementing, for instance,
protocols based upon the validity of relativity and quantum physics). The fourth system
for incentivizing trustworthy behaviour, security systems, encompasses the wide variety of
available security technologies used for detecting tampering, detecting device faults, detecting
eavesdropping, ensuring records are immutable and auditable, ensuring anti-counterfeiting,
and ensuring privacy through secure authentication and encryption technologies.
Blockchain technology allows developers to shift some of the trust in people and insti-
tutions to trust in technology. However, any evaluation of the security of the system has to
take the whole socio-technical system into account.125 In architectures which carry financial
and social implications or consider social dynamics, it is not enough to focus solely on the
technology and ignore the social element, as network trust can’t be entirely replaced by
algorithms and protocols. There is a social system too, where decisions in that system may
be informed by accountability and reputation. Therefore, in this work, we aim to establish a
network architecture whereby use of the network strengthens existing trust relationships. We
aim to implement a trust model whereby abuses of trust do not incur irreversible damages to
those exploited, but do incur reputation penalties for offenders. We argue that the system
architecture we explore, were it not to utilise a blockchain architecture, would lack the
flexibility required to support a broader social context which may utilise metrics for decision
making and for quantifying accountability and reputation.
8. Conclusion
Here we have presented an interactive mining protocol for energy efficient mining on a
quantum–enabled consortium blockchain. The architecture is designed to ensure that the
consortium behaves in the best interest of the network, removing the need for trust in server
operators or network administrators in the mining round. Instead, clients on the network need
only trust the network code and their own devices, and the consortium is held accountable
to act in accordance with the network ruleset. We explore the use of a quantum–secure
authentication protocol for authenticating clients, hardware, and communication channels,
for physical addressing, for prevention against a Sybil attack and for tamper detection of
devices. The tamper detection supports the assumption that devices do not leak information
and that devices function according to the rules of quantum mechanics, which permits the
use of entanglement as a resource for securing the blockchain data structure through an
interactive mining protocol.
Many potential improvements remain. The possibilities and ultimate limitations of a
quantum–enabled blockchain remain largely unexplored, including benchmarks for trans-
action throughput, exploring alternative consensus mechanisms (for instance, those which
allow for chain forks), alternative mining protocols, latency and storage optimisations, op-
timal signing and authentication schemes, optimal mining team construction algorithms,
privacy, and a deep analysis of network vulnerabilities. We note that recent demonstrations
of quantum–secured blockchain networks demonstrate the application of quantum digital
signatures,126 however, the architecture requires an additional infrastructure requirement,
namely, that all quantum servers share quantum communication channels (i.e. optic fiber
links) between one another, and furthermore does not address consensus. In future works,
we plan to expand upon our proof–in–principle experimental demonstrations to include pro-
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motion into a voting round and quantum secure authentication capabilities, and additionally
emphasise the scalability and compatibility of the quantum–enabled blockchain with current
telecommunication infrastructure and emerging quantum technologies.
Looking forwards, there is a promising outlook for quantum networks and protocols,127
128,129,130,131,132,133 especially those which use limited infrastructures and supplement
quantum computing. For instance, recent work on verifiable delegated quantum proto-
cols134,135,136 explore how clients with limited “quantum powers” – namely, the ability to
perform measurements upon qubits, might interact with quantum technologies to verify the
trustworthiness of data outputs. An example in the case of quantum computation is a client
enacting a verifiable delegation protocol to ensure that an untrusted cloud–based quantum
computer correctly performs encrypted quantum computations on behalf of a client. It may
be useful to explore more deeply the utility of these kinds of protocols against untrusted
quantum servers, and more generally to explore the utility of quantum modems for enacting
verifiable delegated quantum protocols against quantum–enabled network infrastructures.
The quantum–enabled blockchain architecture we describe requires a fibre optic infras-
tructure, making the network challenging to implement on a large scale. However, the ability
to witness entanglement in the presence of large losses opens new possibilities for security in
long-range transmission of photonic entanglement over optical fiber, through free space,137 or
to a satellite.138 The architecture we explore opens further avenues for quantum technologies
in the blockchain space, with initial applications perhaps best suited for use in enterprise,
due to the consortium architecture and ease of retrofitting short–to–medium range fibre optic
interconnects. We expect this infrastructure would be particularly interesting to those with
a vision for compatibility with quantum computing, the quantum internet, and the use of
quantum cryptographic encryption protocols on a blockchain.
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Appendix A: Quantum Secure Authentication
1.1. Background—In a real–world setting, the network ruleset for client authentication
should meet modern cybersecurity standards for globally connected devices,139 which natu-
rally includes quantum optical devices embedded into a quantum–enabled blockchain. As a
general rule, authentication mode should ensure140:
i) All interactions between devices are mutually authenticated;
ii) Continuous authentication is used when feasible and appropriate;
iii) All communications between devices is encrypted;
iv) Devices never trust unauthenticated data or code during boot–time;
v) Devices are never permitted to run unauthorised code;
vi) Devices never trust unauthenticated data during run–time; and
vii) When used, cryptographic keys are protected, or are one–time use only (de-
pending on protocol).
The integrity of QSA is guaranteed provided that141 i) it is technically infeasible to
make a physical clone of a photonic key, ii) an adversary is unable to apply arbitrary unitary
transformations to high–dimensional quantum states with low losses (termed quantum–
computational unclonability142), and iii) different challenges are allowed to be applied to the
photonic key. The protocol utilises a challenge/response protocol143 (i.e. round–by–round
interaction between a client and quantum server). Clients request photonic challenges from
the quantum servers, and due to the interactive nature of authentication and mining, it is in the
best interest of quantum servers to support the authentication of clients. The QSA protocol is
unique in that it results in an authenticated quantum channel, whilst circumventing the need
for pre–shared secrets. This finds various applications, for example, in quantum key growing
protocols144 which may be used to generate symmetric encryption keys for quantum–safe
communication without the need for pre–shared secrets.
1.2. Protocol overview—The photonic challenge is randomly chosen from a set of pre–
determined challenges, selected by the quantum server, and is sent to the client’s quantum
modem via a quantum communication channel for direct interaction with the client’s photonic
key. Interaction on the client side transforms the incident photonic challenge into a photonic
response, which is detected on the client side. In accordance with the QSA protocol,
the photonic response pairs uniquely with the photonic challenge, provided the challenge
physically interacts with the correct photonic key. To guarantee accurate pairing, photonic
keys are pre–characterised in a key enrolment stage, with each key requiring ≈50MB of
characterisation data for accurate enrolment. Enrolment can be done in two ways: i) A
certification authority or manufacturer enrols the key. In this case, a key identifier and a
precise characterization of the key are entered into a publicly readable and tamper proof
database (i.e the blockchain which the key will be used to access). Or, ii) a certificate
authority signs a digital certificate containing the key identifier and characterization data.
The certificate is then stored publicly, e.g. through inclusion to the blockchain. When a
verifier wants to see if a certain key is authentic, the challenge-response behaviour is checked
against the enrolled data, which in the case of quantum readout, does not require trust in
the remote key reader. The authentication of the quantum channel is then based on the
possession of a physical object, instead of knowledge of a pre–shared secret. An authentic
detection event on the client side occurs when the response wavefront focusses cleanly onto
an optical detector. The QSA protocol in its original form assumes that a client’s quantum
modem is immune to tampering, since an authentic detection event could be easily spoofed
if the detector was illuminated in a way that appears consistent with correct authentication.
However, the assumption of tampering immunity may be relaxed, provided that the quantum
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server is allowed to send decoy photonic challenges that are randomly and secretly mixed
in with real photonic challenges. In this case, because a client is unable to infer whether
an incident challenge is legitimate or a decoy (due to the no–cloning theorem of quantum
physics), a dishonest client is left uncertain as to whether to correctly illuminate the detector
on any given round. This addition of decoy challenges further protects the network from
false authentications. Based on experimental demonstrations in literature, in the case of an
honest client with a legitimate photonic key, ∼200–500 rounds of key interrogation via the
challenge/response protocol is sufficient for successful authentication, with authentication
concluding in≈200ms–400ms (allowing provision for decoy photonic challenges), with false
authentication rates of 1 in 100 billion.
Appendix B: Experimental Devices and Loopholes
Experimental tests of entanglement witnesses can be technologically demanding. To mit-
igate the technological demands of these tests, it is common practice to make additional
assumptions pertaining to the expected action of experimental devices. Importantly, these
assumptions lie outside of the theoretical framework applied in developing the mathematical
inequalities which witness entanglement. Hence, assumptions of this kind pertain only to
the experimental devices employed in the test; they may affect the test outcomes (allowing
for false positives) but do not affect the veracity of the mathematical derivation. Devices
which act in conflict with such assumptions, resulting in false positives (perhaps due to
interference by an adversary), are said to open experimental loopholes. The key experimental
assumptions, which when subverted, open experimental loopholes, are:
Fair sampling assumption.145 : Non–unit–efficiency detection devices record
events that constitute a fair sample of all possible detection events. The detection
loophole is opened if compromised detectors record a subset of events that are not
representative of the entire set. Invocation of the fair–sampling assumption can be
avoided by employing high–efficiency detectors, overcoming channel/transmis-
sion losses with low–loss channels, or implementing loss–tolerant measurement
strategies.
No–signalling assumption:146 Experimental devices cannot signal information
to each other. The signalling loophole is opened if a compromised apparatus com-
municates secret information to external devices. Invocation of the no–signalling
assumption may be avoided by ensuring space–like separation of devices, or by
proper experimental design and shielding of devices (a common requirement for
cryptographic protocols).
Measurement–independence assumption: Measurement devices and their mea-
surement settings are not pre–programmed or influenced by external sources or
events (past or future). The setting–independence loophole is opened if devices
are externally influenced or their behaviour becomes predictable. Invocation of
the measurement–independence assumption may be avoided by ensuring measure-
ment devices employ genuinely random sources of measurement setting, typically
enacted with a quantum random number generator (QRNG). 147
Ensuring closure of the detection, signalling, and freedom–of–choice loopholes is a routine
requirement in quantum cryptographic protocols and in applied technologies which utilise
tests of quantum correlations.
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